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INTRODUCTION 
More than 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
assistance of counsel for all those charged with a felony in state court. The Court 
later made clear that the guarantee of counsel's assistance extends to all criminal 
defendants faced with incarceration, including those charged with misdemeanors, 
see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661-662 (2002), as well as to juveniles in 
delinquency proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967). 1 Under Gideon 
and its progeny, it is the State's responsibility to ensure that "any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer," be provided counsel to assist in his 
defense. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
This case asks how indigent criminal defendants may vindicate that Sixth 
Amendment right when systemic, structural deficiencies in a State's public 
defender system result in counsel being assigned in name only. In ruling plaintiffs' 
claims nonjusticiable, the district court effectively held that the sole recourse 
1 For simplicity, this brief uses "Gideon" as shorthand for the Court's 
recognition of the right to counsel in felony, misdemeanor, and juvenile contexts. 
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plaintiffs have to redress the systemic deficiencies in Idaho's public defense 
system is through piecemeal, post-conviction litigation of individual ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
That was error. Rather, as the Court of Appeals of New York correctly recognized 
in Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010), indigent criminal 
defendants may challenge systemic Gideon violations through pre-conviction, civil 
constructive-denial-of-counsel claims seeking prospective injunctive relief. 
The availability of pre-conviction civil actions for systemic denials of 
counsel, whether actual or constructive, is critical to protecting the fundamental 
right that Gideon recognized. In ruling that courts are powerless to hear such 
claims, the district court has deprived indigent defendants in Idaho of this essential 
tool, well-grounded in the law, for enforcing their constitutional right to counsel. 
This Court should correct that error. 
INTEREST OF THE UNITED ST ATES 
The United States has a strong interest in ensuring that all jurisdictions-
federal, state, and local-fulfill their constitutional obligation to provide counsel to 
criminal defendants and juveniles facing incarceration who cannot afford an 
attorney, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and In re 
- 2 -
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In March 2010, the Department of Justice (the 
Department) established the Office for Access to Justice (the Office) to address the 
crisis in indigent defense services. The Office coordinates the Department's 
efforts to improve indigent defense. 2 Attorney General Loretta Lynch has 
emphasized the importance of fulfilling Gideon's promise, stating "that this 
Department of Justice and this entire administration will continue to * * * do 
everything in our power to further th[e] important mission" of"ensuring that in the 
United States there is indeed no price tag on justice."3 
The Department of Justice enforces the right to counsel in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 14141. For example, in December 2012, the Department 
entered into a comprehensive memorandum of agreement with Shelby County, 
Tennessee, that requires the county, among other things, to appoint counsel for 
2 Office for Access to Justice, http://www.justice.gov/atj (last visited Apr. 
26, 2016). 
3 Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at White House 
Convening on Incarceration and Poverty (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-
remarks-white-house-convening-incarceration-and. 
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children in delinquency proceedings, and to establish a juvenile defender unit 
within the public defender's office.4 And in July 2015, the Department found that 
the St. Louis County Family Court failed to provide adequate representation to 
children in delinquency hearings. 5 
In September 2015, the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania setting forth the United States' view that civil 
claims seeking prospective, systemic relief for constructive denial of counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment are cognizable. U.S. Br. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, Kuren v. Luzerne Cnty., Nos. 57 MAP 2015, 58 MAP 2015 (Pa. Sept. 
4 See Press Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Enters 
into Agreement to Reform the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, 
Tennessee (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-
justice-enters-agreement-reform-juvenile-court-memphis-and-shelby-county-
tennessee. 
5 See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Releases 
Findings of Constitutional Violations in Juvenile Delinquency Matters by St. Louis 
County Family Court (July 31, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
justice-department-rel eases-find in gs-cons ti tuti onal-vio I ati ons-j uven i I e-
de l in q uen cy-matters. 
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10, 2015). 6 The Department has also filed statements of interest (SOis) at the trial 
court level in cases involving constructive-denial-of-counsel claims under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See U.S. SOI, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-
07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 2014); 7 U.S. SOI, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 
F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. 2:l l-CV-1100);8 see also U.S. SOI, 
NP. v. State, No. 2014-CV-241025 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2015) (addressing 
juveniles' right to counsel). 9 These SOis have addressed the scope of the right to 
counsel, the appropriate remedy for systemic deprivations of that right, or both. 
The Department of Justice also has sought to address the crisis in indigent 
defense services through a number of grant programs as well as support for state 
policy reform. For example, the Department has identified indigent defense as a 
6 Available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/769806/download. 
7 http ://v.,'WW .justice.gov Is ites/ default/files/crt/legacy/2014/09/25/ 
hurrell_soi_9-25-l 4.pdf 
8 http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/08/15/ 
wilbursoi8- l 4-13.pdf 
9 http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/03/13/ 
np _soi_3-l 3-15.pdf 
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priority area for Byrne Justice Assistance Grant funds, the leading source of 
Department of Justice funding to state and local jurisdictions. 10 In 2013, at a 
government-wide event hosted by the Department, the Department's Office of 
Justice Programs announced a collection of grants totaling $6.7 million to improve 
legal defense services for the poor. 11 These grants were preceded in 2012 by a 
$1.2 million grant program, Answering Gideon's Call: Strengthening Indigent 
Defense through Implementing the ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense 
Delivery System, administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. 12 The 
10 See Government Accountability Office, GA0-12-569, Indigent Defense: 
DOJ Could Increase Awareness of Eligible Funding and Better Determine the 
Extent to Which Funds Help Support this Purpose 11-14 (May 2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590736.pdf. 
11 Press Release, Department of Justice, Attorney General Holder 
Announces $6. 7 Million to Improve Legal Defense Services for the Poor (Oct. 30, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/october/13-ag-l 156.html; see also 
Office for Access to Justice, 50 Years Later: The Legacy of Gideon v. Wainwright 
(last updated Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/gallery/50-years-laterthe-
legacy-ofgideon-v-wainwright. 
12 See Department of Justice, Indigent Defense Grants, Training, and 
Technical Assistance (last updated Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atj/ 
indigent-defense-grants-training-and-technical-assistance. 
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Department's efforts to address the crisis in indigent defense with grants and other 
initiatives are ongoing. 13 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The United States will address the following question: 
Whether indigent criminal defendants may bring a civil, pre-conviction 
claim for declaratory and injunctive relief based on constructive denial of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 14 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a class action lawsuit alleging that systemic failings in Idaho's public 
defender system have resulted, and will continue to result, in the constructive 
denial of counsel for indigent criminal defendants in violation of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. (R., pp. 26, 56-57). The named plaintiffs are four 
criminal defendants awaiting trial or sentencing who are unable to afford counsel 
13 See generally Office for Access to Justice, Accomplishments (last updated 
Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/atj/accomplishments. 
14 The United States takes no position on the merits of this particular case or 
on any issues of state law. 
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and who allege to have experienced numerous deficiencies in their appointed 
representation, including but not limited to: 
• the wholesale absence of counsel at initial appearances, resulting in 
plaintiffs' inability to argue for reduced bail and, consequently, 
unnecessary or extended pretrial detention; 15 
• the inability to meet or communicate with their assigned lawyer to 
keep apprised of their case's progress and participate in the 
development of their defense; 
• the lack of meaningful investigation into their cases; 
• the failure to file substantive motions on their behalf; and 
• the lack of funds to retain necessary experts to challenge the 
prosecution's allegations. 
(R., pp. 8-12, 27-33 ). Plaintiff Tracy Tucker, for example, alleges that his 
appointed attorney did not attend his initial appearance, at which the court set a 
$40,000 bail; that during Tucker's three months in jail, he met with his attorney 
15 Unlike in the federal system, Idaho Criminal Rule 44(a) entitles indigent 
defendants to appointed counsel at their initial appearance. 
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only three times-two of which occurred during court appearances-for a total of 
20 minutes; that while in custody he made more than 50 unsuccessful attempts to 
reach his attorney by telephone; and that, as often days before Tucker's trial date, 
his attorney had not conducted any meaningful investigation into his case nor 
discussed relevant discovery materials or trial strategy with Tucker. (R., pp. 8-9). 
The other named plaintiffs allege similar experiences. (R., pp. 9-12). 
Plaintiffs allege that these circumstances "exemplify the experiences of 
thousands of indigent defendants across the State." (R., p. 12). They also allege 
that these deficiencies are the result of systemic, structural problems in the State's 
indigent defense system, including but not limited to: 
• caseloads that far exceed national standards; 
• insufficient funding; 
• lack of meaningful oversight, training, performance standards, 
supervision, or evaluation by the State of county-provided public 
d ,- • 16 e,ense services; 
16 By statute, Idaho has delegated responsibility for providing indigent 
criminal defense to its 44 counties. Idaho Code Ann.§ 19-859 (2015). 
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• lack of independence from local boards of commissioners, which 
control public defender hiring and firing, funding, and resources for 
investigators and experts; and 
• the continued use in many areas of"fixed-fee contracts," which create 
incentives for appointed attorneys to spend as little money and time as 
possible on indigent clients' cases, despite the fact that such contracts 
are prohibited by Idaho Code§ 19-859(4). 
(R., pp. 22-26, 42-52, 55). 
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, sued the 
Governor of Idaho and the seven members of the Idaho Public Defense 
Commission (PDC), 17 all in their official capacities, seeking declaratory and 
17 The PDC is an executive agency established by statute in 2014. Idaho 
Code Ann.§ 19-849 (2015). The PDC is responsible for promulgating rules for 
training, continuing legal education, and data-reporting requirements for public 
defenders. Id.§ 19-850(1)(a). It is also required by statute to hold quarterly 
meetings and to make yearly recommendations to the Idaho legislature regarding 
legislation to improve the public defense system. Id. § 19-850(1 )(b )-( c ). Although 
the statute required the PDC to submit its first recommendations by January 20, 
2015, plaintiffs allege that the PDC had failed to make any such recommendations 
by the time they filed their complaint in June 2015. (R., p. 24). 
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injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. 18 (R., pp. 33-34, 56-58). 
Among other relief requested, plaintiffs asked the court to enter an injunction 
"requiring the State to propose, for th[e] Court's approval and monitoring," both a 
general "plan to develop and implement a statewide system of public defense that" 
complies with the Constitution and, more specifically, "uniform workload, 
performance, and training standards for attorneys representing indigent criminal 
defendants in the State of Idaho in order to ensure accountability and monitor 
effectiveness." (R., p. 58). Plaintiffs also asked the court to enforce the Idaho 
statute "barring the use of fixed-fee contracts in the delivery of indigent-defense 
services." (R., p. 58). 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On January 20, 2016, the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 468-501 ). The court rejected defendants' 
argument that the Governor and PDC members are not proper parties to the Section 
18 Although the complaint also named the State of Idaho as a defendant, the 
district court dismissed the federal claims against the State upon plaintiffs' 
concession that a State is not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. (R., p. 
481). 
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1983 suit, holding that they "have a more than sufficiently close connection" to the 
"enforcement of public defense in Idaho." (R., p. 485). The court held, however, 
that plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable for three interrelated reasons: that 
plaintiffs lack standing, the case is not ripe, and the relief plaintiffs request would 
require the court to invade the province of the legislature. 
First, misconstruing plaintiffs' complaint as alleging a "violation of their 
right to effective assistance of counsel" under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984 ), the court concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to bring such a 
challenge because they have not yet been convicted or sentenced and thus can 
show no injury in fact that could be redressed by a court. (R., pp. 487-492). The 
court also concluded that the deficiencies that plaintiffs allege are not "causally 
connected" to defendants' inaction because neither the Governor nor the PDC "has 
the power and authority to act alone to redress Plaintiffs' grievances"-a holding 
seemingly in tension with the court's conclusion that the Governor and PDC 
members are proper defendants to the Section 1983 action. (R., pp. 489-490). 
Second, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are "not ripe for 
adjudication" for the same reason it held that they lack standing: namely, that they 
have not yet been convicted or sentenced. (R., pp. 493-494 ). The court noted that, 
- 12 -
should plaintiffs ultimately be convicted, they could pursue post-conviction relief 
for ineffective assistance of counsel "[i]n each of their individual cases," and that if 
a court finds "that their constitutional rights have been violated," it could "order a 
specific remedy" such as "a new trial or dismissal of the case." (R., p. 494). 
Finally, the court concluded that granting plaintiffs' requested relief would 
"invade the province of the legislature" because it would require the court both to 
"legislate specific standards" that the State must meet to comply with the 
Constitution and to order the Governor and PDC "to provide adequate funding" to 
meet those standards. (R., pp. 496-498). In the court's view, the proper role of the 
judiciary is to "find[] and redress violations of constitutional rights in individual 
cases," not to ensure that governmental institutions "comply with the laws and the 
Constitution" on a systemic basis. (R., p. 498). 
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on January 25, 2016, see I.A.R. 
14(a), and filed their brief with this Court on April 29, 2016. 
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ARGUMENT 
A PRE-CONVICTION CIVIL CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DENIAL OF 
COUNSEL UNDER GIDEON IS COGNIZABLE AND CONCEPTUALLY 
DISTINCT FROM A POST-CONVICTION CLAIM FOR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER STRICKLAND 
A. A State Violates Gideon If Systemic Structural Limitations Preclude 
Appointed Counsel From Providing Indigent Defendants The "Assistance" 
The Constitution Guarantees 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense." U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States 
Supreme Court held that this right requires States to appoint attorneys to 
defendants charged with felonies who cannot afford to retain counsel. 372 U.S. 
335, 344 (1963). The Court explained that "lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." Ibid.; see also Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 
1088 (2016) ("No one doubts the fundamental character of a criminal defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to the 'Assistance of Counsel."'). This Court has echoed 
that principle. See, e.g., Stuartv. State, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Idaho 1990) (stating 
that "the constitutional right to assistance of counsel" is "fundamental and is not a 
luxury"), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1234 (1996). 
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A State does not satisfy its obligation under Gideon simply by appointing 
lawyers to indigent defendants. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940) 
(the "mere formal appointment" of a lawyer does not satisfy the constitutional right 
to counsel). Rather, those lawyers must be appointed under circumstances that 
permit them to do their jobs. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
the Sixth Amendment "requires not merely the provision of counsel to the accused, 
but 'Assistance,' which is to be 'for his defen[s]e."' United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 654 (1984 ). That right would be "an empty formality" if appointed 
counsel is precluded from providing his or her client any meaningful 
representation. Ungar v. Sarafhe, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). 
The United States Supreme Court has thus long recognized that, even where 
a defendant has been formally appointed a lawyer, the right to counsel may be 
constructively denied. In Powell v. Alabama, for example, the Court held that the 
defendants "were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense" where 
counsel was not assigned until the morning of trial. 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932). 
Observing that it would be "vain" to give a defendant a lawyer "without giving the 
latter any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case," id. at 
59 ( citation omitted), the Court concluded that the duty to appoint counsel "is not 
- 15 -
discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to 
preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case," id. at 
71. Similarly, in Avery v. Alabama, the Court recognized that "the Constitution's 
guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal 
appointment." 308 U.S. at 446. If appointed counsel is denied the opportunity "to 
confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense," the Court observed, 
then the appointment of counsel becomes "a sham and nothing more than a formal 
compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the 
assistance of counsel." Ibid. And in United States v. Cronic, the Court explained 
that there may be circumstances, such as in Powell, where "although counsel is 
available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a 
fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a 
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of 
the trial." 466 U.S. at 659-660. 19 
19 In Cronic and Avery, unlike in Powell, the Court ultimately concluded 
that the right to counsel was not violated, notwithstanding the late appointment of 
counsel. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665; Avery, 308 U.S. at 450-453. The Court 
determined that, in the particular circumstances of those cases, the appointed 
(continued ... ) 
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A claim that a defendant has been denied the assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment-whether actually or constructively-is 
conceptually distinct from a claim that his lawyer's performance was 
constitutionally ineffective. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 
(1984) (distinguishing between ineffectiveness claims and claims of"[a]ctual or 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel"). An ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim-sometimes called a Strickland claim, for the landmark case that 
established the doctrine-focuses on the lawyer's handling of the individual 
defendant's case. To prevail on such a claim, the defendant must show both that 
his lawyer's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. 
at 688, and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. 
at 694. 
( ... continued) 
lawyers were able to subject the government's theory to adversarial testing and 
thus were not merely formal appointments. But in this case, as in other systemic 
constructive-denial-of-counsel claims, plaintiffs allege that the counsel assigned to 
indigent defendants are not subjecting the government's theories to meaningful 
adversarial testing nor providing other traditional markers of representation. 
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In a denial-of-counsel claim, by contrast, "the defendant alleges not that 
counsel made specific errors in the course of representation, but rather that during 
the judicial proceeding he was-either actually or constructively-denied the 
assistance of counsel altogether." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,483 (2000). 
"This is quite different from a case in which it is claimed that counsel's 
performance was ineffective." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988). A denial-
of-counsel claim is an assertion not of substandard representation but of 
nonrepresentation. As the cases demonstrate, moreover, the Court does not 
distinguish between actual and constructive denials of counsel. Having counsel 
that can provide no real "assistance" is tantamount to not having counsel at all. In 
a denial-of-counsel claim, no individualized showing of prejudice is required, as 
"[ a ]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally 
presumed to result in prejudice." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; accord Cronic, 466 
U.S. at 658-660. 
It follows that, to comply with Gideon, the State must do more than simply 
appoint a member of the bar to stand alongside an indigent defendant at trial. If 
systemic, structural conditions are such that appointed counsel functions as counsel 
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in name only, the State has not provided the "assistance" of counsel that Gideon 
and the Sixth Amendment require. 
B. Courts That Have Considered The Issue Have Recognized That A Pre-
Conviction Civil Claim For Constructive Denial Of Counsel Is Cognizable 
Plaintiffs allege that the failures in Idaho's indigent defense system have 
resulted, and will continue to result, in "the constructive denial of counsel" for 
them and those similarly situated. (R., p. 56). The question before this Court is 
whether plaintiffs can bring such a constructive-denial-of-counsel claim in a pre-
conviction civil action seeking prospective injunctive relief, or whether, as the 
district court held, they must wait until they are convicted and sentenced (if they 
are) and raise their challenge in the form of separate, post-conviction ineffective-
assistance claims seeking individual relief. 
This Court should reverse the district court's ruling and hold that pre-
conviction civil claims alleging systemic constructive denials of counsel are 
actionable. Plaintiffs' complaint is not with their individual lawyers' competence 
but with the State's alleged failure, on a system-wide level, to meet "its 
foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal representation" to 
defendants who cannot afford it. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217,222 
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(N.Y. 2010). There is no legal bar to bringing such a claim in a civil suit outside 
the context of a final conviction and sentence; indeed, a pre-trial civil action 
seeking prospective, injunctive relief is the only judicial mechanism by which a 
court can find and remedy a State's systemic noncompliance with Gideon. 
Hurrell-Harring is the leading case recognizing a civil constructive-denial-
of-counsel claim, and it is correctly reasoned. The court in that case recognized a 
constructive denial-of-counsel claim under Gideon that is distinct from an 
ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland. The court determined that, "[g]iven 
the simplicity and autonomy of a claim for nonrepresentation, as opposed to one 
truly involving the adequacy of an attorney's performance, there is no reason 
* * * why such a claim cannot or should not be brought without the context of a 
completed prosecution." 930 N.E.2d at 225-226. The court recognized that 
limiting this type of claim to an action for post-conviction relief would prevent 
courts from effectively remedying systemic Gideon violations. The court 
explained that "the fairly minimal risks involved in sustaining the closely defined 
claim of nonrepresentation we have recognized must be weighed [against] the very 
serious dangers that the alleged denial of counsel entails." Id. at 226. 
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The court in Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 2: 1l-CV-1100, 2012 WL 
600727 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2012) (Wilbur I), followed a similar analysis. Like 
the Hurrell-Harring court, it recognized that plaintiffs' suit did not allege 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, but rather asserted a systemic 
deprivation of the right to counsel promised in Gideon. Id at *2. The Wilbur 
court found that the facts that plaintiffs asserted could support a finding "that the 
assignment of public defenders is little more than a sham," ibid, and concluded 
that a civil action seeking a systemic remedy was appropriate for such allegations, 
explaining that"[ w ]here official government policies trample rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution, the courts have not hesitated to use their equitable powers to 
correct the underlying policies or systems," id. at *3. See also Duncan v. State, 
774 N.W.2d 89, 127-128 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that plaintiffs state a 
valid civil claim where they allege an actual denial of counsel, a constructive 
denial of counsel, or conflicted counsel); Luckey v. Harris, 860 F .2d 1012, 1018 
(11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a civil Sixth Amendment claim was cognizable 
where plaintiffs asserted, among other things, "systemic delays in the appointment 
of counsel," that their attorneys are denied the resources necessary to investigate 
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their cases, and that attorneys are pressured to hurry cases to trial and to enter 
guilty pleas). 20 
In ruling plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable in this case, the district court 
misapprehended the conceptual distinction between pre-conviction, systemic 
constructive-denial-of-counsel claims under Gideon and post-conviction, 
individual ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under Strickland. The court 
concluded that plaintiffs' complaint neither presents a live case or controversy nor 
is ripe for adjudication because "none of the Plaintiffs ha[s] either been convicted 
or sentenced" (R., p. 489) and thus none can show the actual prejudice necessary to 
make out an ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland (R., p. 492). Plaintiffs' 
claim, however, is not that their appointed lawyers have provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance in their individual cases. Rather, their claim is that 
structural, systemic deficiencies in Idaho's indigent defense system have, for them 
and others similarly situated, resulted in "the constructive denial of counsel" in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment and Gideon v. Wainwright. (R., p. 56). As the 
20 This case was dismissed on remand based on abstention grounds under 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 675 
(11th Cir. 1992). But the Eleventh Circuit's initial opinion remains good Jaw. 
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courts in Hurrell-Harring and Wilbur I correctly recognized, such pre-conviction 
Gideon claims are not only cognizable but provide a crucial vehicle for rectifying 
systemic right-to-counsel violations in a way that individual, post-conviction 
Strickland claims cannot. 
The district court was also incorrect to conclude that granting systemic, 
declaratory and injunctive relief of the sort plaintiffs request would violate 
separation-of-powers principles. Courts are not powerless to compel action by 
other branches of government in order to remedy a constitutional violation. To the 
contrary, courts have long recognized the necessity of systemic equitable relief to 
correct unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
As the Hurrell-Harring court observed, "enforcement of a clear constitutional or 
statutory mandate is the proper work of the courts." 930 N.E.2d at 227. Thus, the 
possibility "that a remedy in this action would necessitate the appropriation of 
funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of legislative 
priorities" does not relieve the court "of its essential obligation to provide a remedy 
for violation of a fundamental constitutional right." Ibid. ( citing Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803)). 
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Moreover, contrary to the trial court's assertion, plaintiffs' request for relief 
does not ask the court to enact legislation or otherwise "shape the institutions of 
government" to bring them into compliance with the Constitution. (R., p. 498). 
Rather, plaintiffs seek injunctions "requiring the State to propose" a plan for 
reforming its public defense system. (R., p. 58 (emphasis added)). Under 
plaintiffs' proposal, the court's role would be to approve and monitor the State's 
plan to ensure that it meets constitutional standards. (R., p. 58); see Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 ( 1971) ("Once a right and a 
violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to 
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies."); see also Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133-
1137 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (Wilbur II) (entering continuing injunction against 
municipalities for systemic deprivations of the constitutional right to counsel). In 
any event, any concerns regarding the court's role vis-a-vis the legislature at most 
go to the scope of relief the court might fashion; they do not render the claim 
nonjusticiable, as the court ruled here. 
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C. Constructive Denial Of Counsel Violating Gideon Occurs Where The 
Traditional Markers Of Representation Are Frequently Absent Or 
Significantly Compromised As A Result Of Systemic, Structural Limitations 
A civil claim for prospective, systemic relief based on constructive denial of 
counsel is viable: (I) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers of 
representation-such as timely and confidential consultation with clients, 
appropriate investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's 
case-are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when substantial structural 
limitations-such as a severe lack of resources, unreasonably high workloads, or 
critical understaffing of public defender offices-cause that absence or limitation 
on representation. When the totality of the circumstances indicates that structural 
limitations are causing a system-wide problem of nonrepresentation, indigent 
criminal defendants may seek prospective, systemic relief in a civil suit to protect 
the constitutional right to counsel of the class that they represent. 
Courts assessing a constructive-denial-of-counsel claim should, therefore, 
first consider whether traditional markers of representation are typically present for 
clients of publicly appointed attorneys. These include the attorneys' availability to 
engage in meaningful attorney-client contact to learn from and advise their clients; 
the attorneys' ability to investigate the allegations and the clients' circumstances 
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that may inform strategy; and the attorneys' ability to advocate for clients either 
through plea negotiation, at trial, or post-trial. When these markers of 
representation are absent, there is a serious question whether the assigned counsel 
is merely a lawyer in name only. Indeed, "[ a ]ctual representation assumes a 
certain basic representational relationship." Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224 
(emphasis added); see also Wilbur II, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (finding that, where 
clients met their attorneys for the first time in court and immediately accepted a 
plea bargain without discussing their cases in a confidential setting, the system 
"amounted to little more than a 'meet and plead' system," and that the resulting 
lack of representational relationship violated the Sixth Amendment); Public 
Defender, Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 278 (Fla. 2013) 
(finding denial of counsel where attorneys were "mere conduits for plea offers," 
did not communicate with clients, were unable to investigate the allegations, and 
were unprepared for trial). 
If such markers of traditional representation are typically absent or 
significantly compromised, courts should determine whether such absence is 
caused by systemic structural limitations. Factors to consider include insufficient 
funding, insufficient staffing, excessive workloads, lack of training and 
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supervision, lack of independence, and lack of resources. In Wilbur JI, for 
example, the court noted the structural limitations-insufficient staffing, excessive 
caseloads, and almost nonexistent supervision-that resulted in a system "broken 
to such an extent that confidential attorney/client communications are rare, the 
individual defendant is not represented in any meaningful way, and actual 
innocence could conceivably go unnoticed and unchampioned." 989 F. Supp. 2d at 
1127. Similarly, the court in Public Defender held that the public defender's office 
could withdraw from representation of indigent defendants because of structural 
limitations. 115 So. 3d at 282. Insufficient funds and the resultant understaffing 
and excessive caseloads created a situation where indigent defendants did not 
receive assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 278. 
Other courts have also concluded that severe structural limitations result in a denial 
of the right to counsel. See, e.g., New York Cnty. Lawyers' Ass 'n v. State, 196 
Misc. 2d 761, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding statutory rates for assigned 
counsel unconstitutional as they resulted in denial of counsel and excessive 
caseloads, among other issues); State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138, 144 (N.M. 2007) 
(holding that inadequate compensation of defense attorneys deprived capital 
defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel); cf. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1095 
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( observing that increasing the workload of already "overworked and underpaid 
public defenders" risks "render[ing] less effective the basic right the Sixth 
Amendment seeks to protect"). 
Structural limitations can lead to a situation where even a well-intentioned 
and competent lawyer is merely nominal counsel because the lawyer is unable to 
fulfill the basic obligation of preparing a defense, including conferring with the 
defendant, investigating the facts of the case, interviewing witnesses, securing 
discovery, engaging in motions practice, identifying and hiring experts when 
necessary, and subjecting the evidence to adversarial testing. As the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana stated, "[ w ]e know from experience that no attorney can 
prepare for one felony trial per day, especially if he has little or no investigative, 
paralegal, or clerical assistance." State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993). 
D. Civil Constructive-Denial-Of-Counsel Claims Provide An Important Tool 
For Remedying Systemic Violations Of The Constitutional Right To Counsel 
A pre-conviction, civil constructive-denial-of-counsel claim is an effective 
way for indigent defendants to seek to effectuate the promise of Gideon. 
Individual post-conviction claims cannot provide systemic structural relief that will 
help fix the problem of under-funded and under-resourced public defenders. 
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Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under Strickland are, by definition, 
backward-looking, limited to remedying injury caused by a single lawyer's 
performance in a single case. "[C]ase-by-case requests for new counsel, appeals, 
and/or malpractice actions would not resolve the systemic problems identified by 
plaintiffs, making a request for injunctive and declaratory relief necessary." 
Wilbur I, 2012 WL 600727, at *3. 
Moreover, because Strickland claims require a defendant to show a 
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, they 
cannot prevent harms flowing from denials of counsel that do not ultimately lead to 
a conviction. See Luckey, 860 F .2d at 1017 ( observing that the Sixth Amendment 
"protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial," and that prospective 
relief, because it is "designed to avoid future harm," can "protect constitutional 
rights, even if the violation of these rights would not affect the outcome of a trial"). 
For example, absence of counsel in the early critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding can result in unnecessary and prolonged pretrial detention. Such 
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deprivations of liberty not only risk directly impacting the outcome of a person's 
criminal case, 21 they can also have devastating collateral consequences. 
Unnecessary or prolonged pretrial detention can lead to the defendant losing his 
job or housing, leaving the most vulnerable among us in struggling communities 
trapped in a cycle of perpetual poverty and crisis. 
The civil constructive-denial-of-counsel claim recognized in Hurrell-
Harring and Wilbur I provides indigent defendants deprived of their constitutional 
right to counsel with a meaningful tool for pursuing systemic relief. The district 
court's failure to recognize the availability of such claims, as distinct from post-
conviction Strickland claims, erects a roadblock that will impede indigent 
defendants' ability to vindicate their Sixth Amendment right to counsel and breathe 
life into the "noble ideal" that "every defendant stands equal before the law." 
21 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 & n.35 (1972) (observing that "if 
a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact 
witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense," and citing "statistical evidence that 
persons who are detained between arrest and trial are more likely to receive prison 
sentences than those who obtain pretrial release"); U.S. SOI at 12-13, Varden v. 
City of Clanton, No. 2:15-CV-34 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015) (outlining ways 
pretrial detention can affect outcomes, including by impeding the preparation of 
the defense and increasing the likelihood that a defendant pleads guilty), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/file/340461/download. 
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Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. This Court should remove that roadblock and rule that 
pre-conviction, civil constructive-denial-of-counsel claims seeking prospective 
relief are actionable. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
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